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Abstract
We compare the alternative approaches for regulating genetic informa-
tion in the health insurance market when prevention measures are avail-
able. In the model, firms oﬀer insurance contracts to consumers who are
initially uninformed of their risk type but can obtain such information
by performing a costless genetic test. A crucial ingredient of our analysis
is that information has decision-making value since it allows for optimal
choice of a self-insurance action (secondary prevention). We focus on the
welfare properties of market equilibria obtained under the diﬀerent regu-
latory schemes and, by using an intuitive graphical analysis, we rank them
unambiguously.
Our results show that Disclosure Duty weakly dominates the other
regulatory schemes and that Strict Prohibition represents the worst reg-
ulatory approach.
Keywords: health insurance markets, information gathering, discrim-
ination risk, classification risk, self-insurance.
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1 Introduction
Recent developments in medical science make genetic testing for more than 1000
diseases available to consumers. Genes that imply an elevated risk of several
types of cancer, cardiovascular diseases, Alzheimer’s and Huntington’s disease,
cystic fibrosis, etc. can be detected. Whenever consumers undertake a test they
acquire more precise information on the probability that the illness related to
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the tested gene will occur. This means that individuals can learn information
about their risk. If privacy rules are in place to keep such information private,
adverse selection can arise endogenously in the health insurance market.
In the ongoing debate on the use of genetic information in insurance markets
(illustrated, for example, in Hoy and Ruse 2005) insurance firms are worried
that adverse selection and related ineﬃciencies will increase if consumers can
secretly take a genetic test and conceal its result. On the other hand, consumers
fear that a class of potentially uninsurable individuals, the ”bad genetic risks”,
will be created if insurers can oblige consumers to take a genetic test before
policy purchase. This problem is generally referred to as the ”discrimination
risk”. However, both consumers and insurers agree that individuals should not
lose, because of their fear of the discrimination risk, the important prevention
opportunities oﬀered by genetic information.
As regards prevention opportunities, our model considers secondary preven-
tion measures (early detection of disease). The eﬃcacy of secondary prevention
choices is increasing in the precision of information about the risk of illness (the
higher the consumers’ risk, the higher the benefits they obtain from preven-
tion). Secondary prevention corresponds to a self-insurance measure because
it reduces the health loss when the illness occurs. As an example, we can con-
sider the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genetic mutations which are implicated in many
hereditary breast cancer cases and the genetic mutation responsible for hered-
itary non-polyposis colorectal cancer (HNPCC). An individual who is positive
to a genetic test for one of the mentioned mutations should more frequently
perform screening measures such as mammography and colonoscopy to detect
the illness at an early stage. While some authors have investigated the case of
primary prevention, that is the availability of measures reducing the probability
of illness (see Doherty and Posey 1998, Strohmenger and Wambach 2000, Hoel
and Iversen 2002), no one has analyzed secondary prevention even though an
improved eﬃcacy in the use of such a type of prevention probably represents
the most important health benefit of genetic testing to consumers.
Many elements aﬀect consumer decisions to learn information about their
risk of illness. First, as we already mentioned, genetic information has decision-
making value since it allows secondary prevention measures to be properly tar-
geted to consumer morbidity. In this sense genetic information is beneficial to
consumers. Second, when they gather information, consumers face the risk of
learning that they are high-risk and thus information brings with it the risk of
paying a high premium (classification risk). Since no coverage for the classifi-
cation risk is available, genetic information is costly for risk-averse consumers.1
Finally, the regulatory scheme for genetic information in place in the health
insurance market influences consumer choices, as we will see.
Today four major types of market regulation of genetic information exist
(see Viswanathan et al. 2007, Hoy and Ruse 2005 and references within both
1 In the real world (and in our model as well) the health insurance market is not able to
provide policies that cover the classification risk, despite the obvious increase in consumer
welfare. We discuss a remedy to this issue in subsection 2.3.1.
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of them).2 They are listed below from no-regulation to the most strict regula-
tory scheme. (i) ”Under a Laissez-Faire approach insurers have full freedom to
request new tests and the disclosure of existing tests, and to incorporate test
results in underwriting and rating”. The previous and the following quoted
sentences are taken from Viswanathan et al. (2007), page 68. Laissez-faire is
practiced in Australia, Canada, China, Japan, Korea, Ireland, Portugal, Russia,
Singapore, Spain and South Africa. (ii) Under the Disclosure Duty approach
consumers ”have to disclose the results of existing tests, at the insurers’ request,
but cannot be required to take additional tests”. This is true in Germany, New
Zealand, and the UK. (iii) Under the Consent Law approach consumers ”are
not required to divulge genetic tests results. If they do, insurers may use this in-
formation”, as in the Netherlands and in Switzerland. Finally, (iv) under Strict
Prohibition, ”insurers cannot request genetic tests, cannot require applicant to
provide existing tests results, and cannot use any genetic information in under-
writing and rating”, as in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Israel, Italy and
Norway. In the U.S., the Genetic Information Non-discrimination Act (GINA)
was signed into law in May 2008. The bill places restrictions on insurers, ban-
ning the use of genetic information in underwriting health insurance policies.3
Thus, we can now equate the U.S. approach to Strict Prohibition.
The question of genetic privacy is still hotly debated in many countries, as
documented by the recent adoption of GINA in the U.S. and by the ongoing
discussion (fall 2008) in Germany where a new law aiming at full prohibition of
the use of genetic test results in health insurance has been proposed.4 More-
over, most countries seem to converge towards assigning consumers full privacy
on genetic information and banning information transmission to insurers (Strict
Prohibition). Also, being aware of the current public perception that genetic
information is somehow diﬀerent from other health information5, in some coun-
tries insurance firms have signed a voluntary moratorium on the use of genetic
information in health insurance policies (e.g. in the U.K. and in France).
In this paper we consider a simple model which enables us to analyze and
compare the previously mentioned regulatory approaches for genetic informa-
tion when secondary prevention is available. We characterize market outcomes
under the diﬀerent regulatory structures and derive a complete ranking. We
believe such a welfare analysis is worthwhile in the debate on genetic testing to
understand which regulatory approach is preferable from a social welfare point
of view and whether protecting consumers’ privacy on genetic information really
2A similar list appears in Doherty and Thistle (1996) as regards regulatory schemes con-
cerning HIV testing and insurance.
3 In general, regulation of genetic information is much stricter in the health than in the life
insurance market. The implicit reason is that health insurance is considered a priority for
consumers whereas life insurance is not.
4This means that Germany is moving from the Disclosure Duty to the Strict Prohibition
approach.
5This is called ”genetic exceptionalism” and is due to many reasons. Among them are
historical reasons (eugenetics), the potential loss of control over samples and the predominance
of predictive genetic tests for monogenetic, very serious diseases (e.g. Huntington’s disease).
See the European Commission (2004).
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increases consumers’ welfare and really avoids the discrimination risk. To the
best of our knowledge this type of analysis is missing in the literature on genetic
testing.
In the model we consider the following timing of actions (in all the regu-
latory approaches, except in the Laissez-Faire where the order of the first two
actions is reversed). First, insurance firms propose contracts to consumers. Sec-
ond, consumers decide whether to perform a costless genetic test and, possibly,
whether to show its result to the insurers. Then consumers accept a contract
and, finally, they choose prevention taking as given the insurance policy.
Our results show that from a social welfare point of view, the Disclosure
Duty approach weakly dominates all the other regulatory schemes. The Laissez-
Faire and the Consent Law approaches lead to the same equilibrium allocation.
The equilibrium allocation under Strict Prohibition is dominated by all other
regulatory schemes. Under Consent Law and Strict Prohibition information al-
ways has positive private value, whereas Disclosure Duty leads to information
gathering only when the benefit of better prevention choices prevails over the
cost raised by the classification risk. This is precisely why Disclosure Duty
maximizes consumers’ welfare. When, under Disclosure Duty, information has
positive value, this regulatory scheme leads to the same equilibrium allocation as
Consent Law and Laissez-Faire. In all the regulatory approaches, when the test
is performed, information is disclosed at the equilibrium. Under Consent Law,
information is certifiable and it is transmitted at no cost by low-risk consumers
showing insurers the test result whereas under Strict Prohibition, screening is
obtained through the Rothschild-Stiglitz separating allocation, thus the equilib-
rium implies a welfare loss since the low-risks receive partial insurance. Strict
Prohibition is the only regulatory scheme that endogenously generates adverse
selection. As regards prevention choices, when information always has positive
private value, that is with Laissez-Faire, Consent Law and Strict Prohibition,
choices are always eﬃcient (in a sense that will be specified in the paper) whereas
under Disclosure Duty, they are eﬃcient only when consumers learn information.
As is discussed in the concluding section, our results have important policy
implications since the most commonly adopted regulatory scheme turns out to
be the least eﬃcient one.
As regards the related literature, all the papers dealing with genetic testing
are clearly relevant.6 However, the papers most closely related to our study
analyze endogenous information in insurance markets and are mentioned below.
Crocker and Snow (1992) first showed that, if coverage against the classifica-
tion risk is not available and if insurers can observe both whether consumers
performed the test and the test result itself, the private value of information
6For example, in Hoel and Iversen (2002) genetic information allows better primary pre-
vention measures to be taken and the health insurance market is characterized by a mix of
compulsory and voluntary insurance. Hoel et al. (2006) analyze a model where consumers
are characterized by preferences for late resolution of uncertainty concerning their health risk.
Strohmenger and Wambach (2000) analyze a model with state contingent utility functions.
Hoy and Polborn (2000) consider a life insurance model. Interesting empirical analysis can be
found in Hoy and Witt (2007), Viswanathan et al. (2007).
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is negative and consumers prefer to remain uninformed. Doherty and Thistle
(1996) developed a model where some consumers are initially informed on their
risk type and others are not. They showed that information has positive pri-
vate value only when insurers cannot observe consumers’ information status,
that is if consumers can conceal not only the test result but also the fact that
they performed the test. Both when information provided by the test is not
verifiable and when the test result is certifiable (that is under Strict Prohibi-
tion and Consent Law respectively), at the equilibrium all consumers perform
the test. In Doherty and Posey (1998) information has decision-making value.
However, as already noted, the latter authors analyze the case of self-protection;
we instead consider the case of self-insurance. Moreover, all the previously men-
tioned authors analyze one or two information structures at most, we instead
compare all the alternative regulatory approaches and we are able to rank them
unambiguously. Finally our paper is also related to the more general literature
on information gathering before contracting (among others Hirshleifer 1971 and
Khalil and Cremer 1992)7 and, more closely, to the literature on the economics
of privacy. In line with the Chicago School approach to the latter issue (for
example Stigler 1980 and Posner 1981), our results show that privacy is not
welfare improving. In our model this happens because, if privacy is assigned to
consumers on their information status and on test results, consumers decide to
learn information also when it is ineﬃcient to do so.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model set-up
and analyses the decision-maker’s problem without insurance. Subsection 2.2
describes how insurance coverage aﬀects consumer choices in terms of prevention
and defines the interim optimal allocation. Subsection 2.3 shows the ex-ante op-
timal allocation and discusses how to decentralize such allocation in the market.
Both the interim optimal and the ex-ante optimal allocations will be used to
rank market outcomes in the subsequent sections. In section 3 market equilibria
are obtained and characterized under the diﬀerent regulatory schemes. In Sec-
tion 4 we compare the alternative regulatory structures and derive a complete
ranking. Section 5 provides some final remarks and discusses policy implica-
tions. We relegate almost all the proofs to the appendix.
2 The model
Decision-makers are endowed with a fixed amount of wealth w, and are charac-
terized by the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u(w), increasing and
concave. They face the risk of a monetary loss L (a) , where 0 < L (a) < w.
The action a is a self-insurance measure. By interpreting L(.) as the monetary
equivalent of a negative health shock, the action a refers to secondary preven-
tion or early detection of disease. The action can take only two values, 0 and 1
(either decision-makers perform prevention or not) with L(1) = l < L(0) = L.
Moreover, the action a is taken before the realization of the risk and implies a
7See Bennardo (2008) for a recent analysis along these lines.
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utility cost Ψ (a), with Ψ(0) = 0 and Ψ(1) = Ψ. In the real world secondary
prevention which allows early curative action is generally observable and certi-
fiable; thus, we assume that insurers observe the action a. As a consequence,
all the insurance contracts analyzed in the paper are contingent on the level of
secondary prevention.
We consider two decision-maker types, the high- and the low-risks, respec-
tively characterized by the probability pL and pH of incurring the loss, with
0 < pL < pH < 1. We assume that pL and pH are fixed, so that no ex-ante
moral hazard problem exists. The proportion of high- and low-risk types in the
population is λ and (1 − λ) respectively. These parameters are assumed to be
common knowledge.
Consumers do not know their type ex-ante, they perceive their loss proba-
bility as pU = λpH + (1 − λ)pL. Information can be gathered without cost by
performing a genetic test.
Risk neutral insurance companies propose contracts to consumers. The in-
surance market is characterized by free entry such that insurance firms earn zero
profits in equilibrium. This is why, in our analysis, social welfare corresponds
to consumer welfare.
2.1 The decision-maker’s problem without insurance
In this subsection we focus on the decision whether to gather information when
insurance is not available.
Consumers decide whether to learn information or not by anticipating that,
in the subsequent stage, they will choose whether to perform prevention given
the information they may have acquired.
Proceeding backward, let’s consider the second stage, that is the choice of
the preventative action. An individual characterized by loss probability pi ∈
{pL, pU , pH} who chooses action a achieves the following expected utility level:
V (pi, a) = piu(w − L(a)) + (1− pi)u(w)−Ψ(a)
The decision-maker chooses a positive amount of prevention if V (pi, 1) ≥
V (pi, 0), that is if piu(w − l) + (1− pi)u(w)−Ψ ≥ piu(w − L) + (1− pi)u(w),
or:
pi ≥
Ψ
u(w − l)− u(w − L) =
Ψ
∆0
(1)
The term ∆0 is positive and measures the benefit from prevention. When
this term is large and/or the cost of prevention Ψ is low, inequality (1) is easily
verified. Put diﬀerently, inequality (1) shows that decision-makers choose to
perform prevention when their loss probability is suﬃciently high.
Remark 1 The uninsured decision-makers choose prevention if inequality (1)
holds. This implies that incentives to perform prevention are increasing in the
decision-makers’ risk.
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Let’s define ba(pi) the action chosen by an individual characterized by prob-
ability of loss pi and bV (pi) the individual’s indirect expected utility when the
probability is pi and the chosen action is ba(pi).
In the first stage, uninformed decision-makers compare utility when they
remain uninformed to expected utility when they gather information, that is
Vˆ (pU ) to λbV (pH) + (1 − λ)bV (pL). The following remark illustrates consumer
choices about information when insurance is not available.
Remark 2 Without insurance, (i) when prevention is optimal for low-risks
(pL ≥ Ψ∆0 ) or when no-prevention is optimal for high-risks (pH ≤
Ψ
∆0
), decision-
makers are indiﬀerent between remaining uninformed and gathering informa-
tion. (ii) When pL < Ψ∆0 < pH uninformed decision-makers acquire information
on their risk-type.
Proof. See Appendix 6.1.
From 1, when prevention costs are such that the optimal action for in-
formed low-risks is a positive level of prevention, prevention is optimal also
for uninformed and informed high-risks. Thus, uninformed individuals are in-
diﬀerent between acquiring and not acquiring information. The same reason-
ing applies when informed high-risks choose no-prevention.8 On the contrary,
when pL < Ψ∆0 < pH , positive prevention is optimal for high-risks whereas
no-prevention is the optimal choice for low-risks. Intuitively, here information
is useful for appropriate prevention decisions so that acquiring information is
welfare improving. Note that, since no insurance is available, when deciding
whether to gather information individuals do not face the classification risk,
they simply anticipate the positive eﬀect of information in terms of better pre-
vention choices.
Social welfare when insurance is not available, W0, is represented in Figure
1 as a function of prevention cost Ψ. Note that, for 0 ≤ Ψ ≤ ∆0pL, both types
perform prevention; for ∆0pL < Ψ < ∆0pH high-types only perform prevention;
for Ψ ≥ ∆0pH no one performs prevention.
We conclude this section by observing that, without insurance, the private
and social value of information is positive for ∆0pL < Ψ < ∆0pH .9 In all the
other cases the private and social value of information is zero and decision-
makers are indiﬀerent between remaining uninformed and gathering informa-
tion.
2.2 Interim optimal insurance
We analyze here optimal insurance contracts from an interim perspective, that
is when decision-makers perform the test and the test result is public informa-
8Note that, when the action a is not available, uninsured decision-makers are always in-
diﬀerent between remaining uninformed and learning their type. In other words, without
insurance and considering decision-makers uniquely concerned with information gathering,
V (pU ) is always equivalent to λV (pH) + ( 1− λ)V (pL).
9Note that, under the Law of Large Number, consumers’ expected utility and social welfare
are the same such that the private and social value of information are equivalent.
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tion. In the next sub-paragraph we will analyze the ex-ante optimal allocation.
Both the ex-ante optimal and the interim optimal allocation will be used to
characterize and rank market outcomes under the diﬀerent regulatory schemes.
In the following Pi indicates the insurance premium and Ii the indemnity
reimbursed in the event of the loss occurring. The optimal contract is hence the
solution of the following program:(
max
Pi,Ii,ai
piu (w − Pi − L (ai) + Ii) + (1− pi)u (w − Pi)−Ψ (ai)
s.t.: Pi ≥ piIi
where i = L,H. Obviously the optimal contract provides full-insurance: Ii =
L (ai) at a fair premium.
Assuming full information, risk neutral insurance firms and free entry, the
interim optimal allocation can be decentralized in the market. In such a case
consumers choose prevention given the full-insurance contract (piL (ai) , L (ai)).
The level W (pi, a) of utility achieved by a decision-maker characterized by risk
pi and action a is:
W (pi, a) = u(w − piL(a))−Ψ(a)
Prevention is positive if W (pi, 1) ≥W (pi, 0):
u(w − pil)−Ψ ≥ u(w − piL)
or:
∆(pi) = u(w − pil)− u(w − piL) ≥ Ψ (2)
Remark 3 In the interim optimal allocation: (i) prevention is performed if
inequality (2) holds; (ii) incentives to perform prevention are increasing in the
decision-maker’s risk; (iii) given a risk pi, incentives to perform prevention are
lower than without insurance.
Proof. See Appendix 6.2.
Note that, if ∆(pi) < Ψ ≤ pi∆0, type-pi does not exert prevention when
fully insured whereas he chooses positive prevention when uninsured. In fact,
insurance reduces the benefits from the preventative action and discourages
prevention for a given risk.
Total welfare in the interim optimal allocation is:
W ∗I = λu(w−pHL(a˜(pH)))+(1−λ)u(w−pLL(a˜(pL)))−λΨ(a˜(pH))−(1−λ)Ψ(a˜(pL))
(3)
where a˜(pi), the action chosen by an individual characterized by risk pi, is 1 if
inequality (2) holds and 0 otherwise. From Remark 3:
Definition 1 (Interim optimal allocation) The interim optimal allocation
W ∗I is the allocation such that decision-makers are informed and fully insured.
Premium is type-dependent and equal to P˜i = piL(a˜(pi)). Moreover:
• when 0 ≤ Ψ ≤ ∆(pL), a˜(pL) = a˜(pH) = 1.
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Figure 1: social welfare without insuranceW0 and the interim optimal allocation
W ∗I .
• when ∆(pL) < Ψ ≤ ∆(pH), a˜(pL) = 0, a˜(pH) = 1.
• when Ψ > ∆(pH), a˜(pL) = a˜(pH) = 0.
Figure 1 describes total welfare in the interim optimal allocation as a func-
tion of the cost of prevention Ψ and oﬀers a graphical representation of expres-
sion 3.
2.3 Ex-ante optimal insurance (the first-best)
We now define the ex-ante optimal allocation as the allocation maximizing ex-
ante expected utility under the feasibility constraint and such that decision-
makers acquire information after the contract is oﬀered. Both coverages for the
classification risk and for the risk of the loss are thus available. Everything is
observable and contractible.
The first-best contract solves:
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
max
PH ,IH ,PL,IL,aH ,aL
λ (pHu(w − PH − L(aH) + IH) + (1− pH)u(w − PH)−Ψ(aH))+
(1− λ) (pLu(w − PL − L(aL) + IL) + (1− pL)u(w − PL)−Ψ(aL))
s.t.: λPH + (1− λ)PL ≥ λpHIH + (1− λ)pLIL
Obviously the first-best implies full insurance: Ii = L(ai), i = L,H. More-
over, since the ex-ante optimal insurance covers the classification-risk, the op-
timal premium is uniform: P ∗ = λpHL(aH) + (1− λ)pLL(aL).
The optimal prevention decisions, a∗i , i = L,H, are the solutions of:
max
aH ,aL
WEA(aH , aL) = u(w−λpHL(aH)−(1−λ)pLL(aL))−λΨ(aH)−(1−λ)Ψ(aL)
(4)
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Depending on which type performs prevention, four cases are possible:
W ∗1EA = u(w − pU l)−Ψ (5)
W ∗2EA = u(w − λpH l − (1− λ)pLL)− λΨ (6)
W ∗3EA = u(w − λpHL− (1− λ)pLl)− (1− λ)Ψ (7)
W ∗4EA = u(w − pUL) (8)
Welfare is W ∗1EA (W
∗4
EA) when both types (no type) perform prevention whereas
W ∗2EA andW
∗3
EA correspond to the cases where only high-types and only low-types
respectively perform prevention. BetweenW ∗2EA andW
∗3
EA the most natural case
to analyze is the one where prevention is performed by high-types, as in the
interim optimal allocation. Thus, we assume that ∀Ψ, W ∗2EA ≥ W ∗3EA. It can
be easily checked that two suﬃcient conditions are: (a) λpH ≥ (1 − λ)pL, (b)
λ ≤ (1− λ). Note that, according to condition (b), the proportion of high-risks
in the population must be lower than that of low-risks: λ ≤ 1/2. Conditions
(a) and (b) together indicate that the loss probability pH must be suﬃciently
higher than pL, in particular pH ≥ 1−λλ pL where
1−λ
λ ≥ 1.10
We define the ex-ante optimal allocation as follows:
Definition 2 (Ex-ante optimal allocation) The first-bestW ∗EA is the alloca-
tion such that both the classification risk and the risk of the loss are fully covered.
Consumers pay the uniform premium P ∗ = λpHL(a∗H) + (1− λ)pLL(a∗L), learn
their risk and, under assumption 1, decide whether to perform prevention:
• when 0 ≤ Ψ ≤ u(w−pU l)−u(w−λpH l−(1−λ)pLL)1−λ = Ψ1, a∗L = a∗H = 1.
• when Ψ1 ≤ Ψ ≤ u(w−λpH l−(1−λ)pLL)−u(w−pUL)λ = Ψ2, a∗L = 0, a∗H = 1.
• when Ψ ≥ Ψ2, a∗L = a∗H = 0.
Definition 2 shows that, as in the interim optimal allocation, when the cost
of prevention is low both types perform prevention; as the cost of prevention
increases only high-types perform prevention; finally, when the cost is suﬃciently
high, no prevention is performed. Obviously, in the ex-ante and interim optimal
allocations, threshold values for Ψ diﬀer. Figure 2 describes social welfare in
first-best W ∗EA as a function of the cost of prevention Ψ.
Note that, since in the ex-ante optimal allocation the classification risk is
covered whereas in the interim optimal it is not, the ex-ante optimal allocation
dominates the interim one.
10Note that both types pay the same premium irrespective of their action and get (gross)
utility u(w − P ). When the action chosen by the two types is diﬀerent, those performing
prevention suﬀer the disutility loss Ψ and receive a lower net utility. In this case the social
planner may want to introduce some transfers aiming at redistributing between the two groups
the monetary equivalent of prevention cost.
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Figure 2: social welfare with full insurance and with no information WU and
the ex-ante optimal allocation W ∗EA.
2.3.1 How to implement the first-best: "genetic insurance"
Tabarrok (1994), discussing insurance issues related to genetic testing, proposes
decentralizing the ex-ante optimal allocation by creating a market selling insur-
ance against the classification risk. Such a policy, ”genetic insurance”, should
be mandatory for those who decide to gather information: information acquisi-
tion should be possible only after insurance against classification risk has been
purchased. This can be enforced by making it illegal for physicians and labo-
ratories to run tests without proof that genetic insurance has been bought. In
this way adverse-selection problems can be avoided.
Let’s assume, for the moment, that insurers oﬀer both coverage against the
risk of the loss and coverage against the classification risk, and that genetic
insurance is mandatory for those who decide to test. Moreover, as before, the
insurance market is characterized by free entry. We show below that consumers
would purchase genetic insurance and would learn information such that the
first best would be implemented. To do this we must compare utility when the
test is performed to utility when consumers decide to remain uninformed. Since
decision-makers must purchase genetic insurance to learn information, if they
decide to test, as in the ex-ante optimal allocation they must pay the premium
P ∗ = λpHL (a∗H) + (1− λ) pLL (a∗L) (remember that consumers are all equal
ex-ante). Moreover, they are committed to performing action a∗i , i = L,H,
whenever the test certifies that the type is i, as according to (4). Once genetic
insurance has been bought, decision-makers perform the test and exhibit the test
result to the insurer. Consumers receive reimbursement piL (a∗i ) and, with that
amount, they purchase fair, full insurance against the risk of the loss and choose
the optimal action a∗i , i = L,H. Thus, when genetic insurance is available and
consumers decide to learn information, they obtain the first-best utility.
Now we find utility when genetic testing is not performed. The following
remark describes social welfare when consumers remain uninformed in the in-
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surance market with free entry:
Remark 4 (The allocation when consumers remain uninformed) Social
welfare when consumers remain uninformed is WU = u (w − pUL (a˜(pU ))) −
Ψ (a˜(pU )) . Consumers are fully insured and pay the premium pUL (a˜(pU )).
Moreover, according to inequality (2): for Ψ ≤ ∆(pU ), a˜(pU ) = 1 whereas
for Ψ > ∆(pU ), a˜(pU ) = 0.
In Figure 2 utility WU is represented by the dotted kinked line.
Note that, for Ψ ≤ Ψ1 and Ψ ≥ Ψ2, in the ex-ante optimal allocation both
informed types choose the same action, thus decision-makers are indiﬀerent
between learning information and remaining uninformed (WU ≡W ∗EA). On the
contrary, for Ψ1 < Ψ < Ψ2, P ∗ 6= pUL (a˜(pU )) and WU is dominated by W ∗EA.
Obviously this happens since, with information gathering, prevention choices
are more eﬃcient.
We can conclude that mandatory genetic insurance allows the first-best to
be decentralized.11
3 The insurance market under the alternative
regulatory schemes
Ex-ante all decision-makers are uninformed; they can remain uninformed or they
can perform a genetic test. Insurance against classification risk is not available
and, in this sense, the market that we consider is ineﬃcient even when adverse
selection does not arise. The sequence of actions changes slightly according to
the regulatory approach analyzed. We will describe the timing in detail in each
of the following subparagraphs, starting with the disclosure duty approach.
3.1 The Disclosure Duty approach
Under this regulatory approach decision-makers are obliged to disclose the result
of previously performed genetic tests to insurers, but cannot be required to
take additional tests. Note that, under both Laissez-Faire and Disclosure Duty,
consumers’ information status and the test results are observed by insurers. The
diﬀerence between the two regulatory schemes is that, under Laissez-Faire, the
11 Insurance against the classification risk is also the key element of Cochrane’s (1995) ”time-
consistent insurance”. Time-consistent insurance provides insurance against classification risk
as well as insurance against the uncertain component of one period health expenditures.
For the implementation of insurance against the classification risk in a dynamic context the
author proposes a severance payment : a person whose premium increases (for example because
a long-term illness is diagnosed) receives a lump sum equal to the increased present value of
his premium. The severance payment scheme compensates for changes in premium and allows
every consumer to purchase insurance at his actuarially fair premium.
Apart the fact that we do not consider any dynamic in our model, an important diﬀerence
with respect to time-consistent insurance is that, in the present framework, consumers decide
whether to gather (possibly) private information on their risk, whereas in Cochrane’s model
information on consumers’ risk is always publicly disclosed in each period.
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decision whether to perform the test is in practice assigned to insurers, whereas
under Disclosure Duty consumers are the decision-makers.
Insurance contracts can be contingent on informational status and risk. The
timing of actions is the following: first, insurers propose contracts, then con-
sumers decide whether to perform the test. Insurers observe the consumer
decisions and, if the test is performed, its result is disclosed. Consumers then
accept a contract and choose prevention.
Insurance firms oﬀer three diﬀerent types of contract: the full coverage con-
tract for the uninformed, the full coverage contract for informed high-risks and
the full coverage contract for informed low-risks. If consumers choose to remain
uniformed, they obtain with certainty the full coverage contract for uninformed
and achieve the level of utility WU represented in Figure 2 and described in
Remark 4. When, on the other hand, decision-makers choose to perform the
test, they obtain the full coverage contract for high-risks with probability λ and
the full coverage contract for low-risks with probability 1 − λ. That is, they
obtain the interim optimal allocationW ∗I defined in section 2.2 and represented
in Figure 1. Thus, information gathering depends on the comparison between
utility when decision-makers remain uninformed WU and expected utility cor-
responding to the interim optimal allocation W ∗I .
Two antagonistic eﬀects are at stake in determining the relative positions
of WU and W ∗I . On the one hand, information gathering results in facing the
classification risk and hence has a negative eﬀect on welfare; on the other hand,
it allows a more eﬃcient choice of prevention which is beneficial. Intuitively,
when the classification risk is not too large (pH−pL low) and/or when consumers
are not too risk-averse, and/or when the benefits from prevention are high (L/l
large), consumers should prefer to perform the test.
It is easy to verify that two cases are possible.
Definition 3 Equilibrium of Type 1 occurs if WU always dominates W ∗I . Equi-
librium of Type 2 occurs if WU and W ∗I cross each other.
Note that, in Equilibrium of Type 2, values of Ψ for which W ∗I dominates
WU exist inside the interval [∆(pL),∆(pH)] (see the kinked bold line in Figure
3). In particular, Remark 5 can be stated given the following inequality:
u(w−pU l)−u(w−pH l)
(pH−pU )l
u(w−pLL)−u(w−pUL)
(pU−pL)L
>
L
l
(9)
Remark 5 Under the Disclosure Duty approach, (i) if inequality (9) is satis-
fied, expected utility with the test is always dominated by utility without the test;
(ii) otherwise, expected utility with the test dominates utility without the test in
the interval Ψ3 < Ψ < Ψ4 and is dominated elsewhere, with:
Ψ3 =
1
1− λ [u(w − pU l)− λu(w − pH l)− (1− λ)u(w − pLL)]
Ψ4 =
1
λ
[λu(w − pH l) + (1− λ)u(w − pLL)− u(w − pUL)] ,
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Figure 3: equilibrium allocation under Disclosure Duty when WU and W ∗I cross
each other.
Proof. See Appendix 6.3.
Remark 6 The opposite of inequality (9) is verified if pH − pL is smaller than
a threshold increasing function of L/l.
Proof. See Appendix 6.4.
The previous remark shows that, when the classification risk is low and/or
when the potential gain from prevention is high, decision-makers learn informa-
tion for Ψ3 < Ψ < Ψ4 since, in that interval, the gain due to information is
larger than the loss due to increased risk. In all the other cases the benefit of
information is dominated by the welfare cost caused by the classification risk.12
From Remark 5 and from the previous discussion:
Lemma 1 (Equilibrium allocation under Disclosure Duty) Under the
Disclosure Duty approach two diﬀerent equilibria are possible: (i) Equilibrium
of Type 1 occurs if inequality (9) holds. At this equilibrium decision-makers
always remain uninformed. (ii) Equilibrium of Type 2 occurs if the opposite of
inequality (9) holds. At this equilibrium decision-makers perform the test for
Ψ3 < Ψ < Ψ4 and remain uninformed elsewhere.
Croker and Snow (1992) show that, when insurance against the classification
risk is not available and insurance firms and consumers have access to the same
information, the private value of such information is negative for consumers.
Lemma 1 extends Croker and Snow’s result to the case where information has
decision-making value: when secondary prevention is available, for intermediate
12Note that the lower the proportion of high-risk in the population λ, the less negative the
slope of the line λu(w − pH l) + (1 − λ)u(w − pLL) − λΨ (see Figure 3), and the higher the
probability that W∗I and WU cross each other inside the interval [∆(pL),∆(pH)] . In fact a
low λ implies that social welfare W∗I decreases slowly with Ψ when high-risks only perform
prevention: close to ∆(pU ) the social cost of prevention λΨ is low.
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values of prevention cost consumers may prefer to acquire information. In fact,
when prevention cost is close to ∆(pU ) ignorance can make decision-makers’
prevention choices very ineﬃcient: for Ψ3 ≤ Ψ ≤ ∆(pU ) uninformed low-types
perform prevention despite prevention cost being too high given their risk and,
for ∆(pU ) ≤ Ψ ≤ Ψ4, uninformed high-types do not perform prevention despite
prevention cost being suﬃciently low given their risk.
The following corollary summarizes the welfare properties of the equilibrium
allocations described in Lemma 1.
Corollary 1 (Welfare properties of equilibrium allocations under Dis-
closure Duty) When insurance against classification risk is not available and
a Disclosure Duty rule is in place: (i) in Type 1 Equilibrium social welfare is
WU : with respect to the first-best over-prevention arises for Ψ1 < Ψ ≤ ∆(pU )
whereas under-prevention arises for ∆(pU ) < Ψ < Ψ2. (ii) in Type 2 Equi-
librium, in the interval Ψ3 ≤ Ψ ≤ Ψ4 the interim optimal allocation W ∗I is
reached and prevention choices are interim eﬃcient whereas for Ψ < Ψ3 and
Ψ > Ψ4 social welfare is WU with over-prevention arising for Ψ1 < Ψ < Ψ3 and
under-prevention arising for Ψ4 < Ψ < Ψ2. (iii) Welfare losses (with respect to
the first-best) are lower in Type 2 Equilibrium than in that of Type 1. In both
equilibria first-best is reached for Ψ ≤ Ψ1 and Ψ ≥ Ψ2.
Proof. (i) The welfare comparison betweenWU andW ∗EA can be easily obtained
from Figure 2. (ii) The welfare comparison between Equilibrium of type 2 and
first-best can be performed by comparingW ∗EA in Figure 2 with the kinked bold
line in Figure 3 and noting that Ψ1 < Ψ3 < Ψ4 < Ψ2.
As a final observation, in our graphical analysis the vertical distance between
the kinked lines W ∗I and WU for Ψ = 0 describes the welfare loss that decision-
makers incur when they face the classification risk (see Figure 3).
In this last paragraph we consider the private and social value of information
under Disclosure Duty. For the Law of Large Numbers, W ∗I and WU represent
both consumers’ (expected) utility and social welfare. Moreover, given the infor-
mational structure characterizing Disclosure Duty, the private and social value
of information are equivalent.
Corollary 2 (The value of information under Disclosure Duty) Under
Disclosure Duty, the private and social value of information are the same. In
Equilibrium of Type 1 the value of information is always negative. In Equi-
librium of Type 2 the value of information is positive for Ψ3 < Ψ < Ψ4 and
negative for Ψ < Ψ3 and Ψ > Ψ4.
3.2 The Consent Law approach
Under Consent Law decision-makers can secretly take the test before insurance
purchase and are then free to show the test result or to conceal it. If they
transmit the information provided by the test to insurers, the latter can use such
information for rating. Thus, insurers oﬀer contracts contingent on information
15
Figure 4: consumers’ decision-tree under Consent Law.
that may have been disclosed by consumers. Figure 4 shows the decision-makers’
decision tree under Consent Law.
Informed individuals who learn that they are low-types have incentives to
show the test result to insurers to buy the policy at a low premium. Individuals
who receive bad news, on the other hand, prefer to conceal the test result by
pretending to be uninformed. Since insurers are not able to separate (ex-ante)
the informed high-risks from the uninformed, they must oﬀer the same contract
to both of them (see Figure 4).
In this situation, if decision-makers choose to perform the test, insurance
firms can easily screen consumer types by oﬀering full insurance at a fair pre-
mium to low-risks who show the test result. Decision-makers pretending to be
uninformed are necessarily high-risks and, at the equilibrium, they also receive
full insurance at a fair premium. This screening mechanism works only if per-
forming the test is a dominant strategy for uninformed consumers. We show
in the proof of the following lemma that decision-makers do prefer to acquire
information if firms oﬀer to uninformed individuals a (partial) insurance con-
tract such that informed high-risks, by accepting such a policy, receive the same
utility as they would by showing insurers the test result. The intuition is that,
by performing the test, decision-makers can always obtain the same utility as
uninformed (when they learn they are high-risk) or they may be able to choose
a policy that is strictly preferred (when they learn that they are low-risk).
Lemma 2 (Equilibrium allocation under Consent Law) Under the Con-
sent Law approach, at the equilibrium decision-makers perform the test and
show the test result to insurers when they learn that they are low-risk. Both
types receive full insurance at a fair premium.13
13The described equilibrium is unique. In fact, no other equilibrium exists where consumers
learn information, nor an equilibrium where decision-makers remain uninformed. To see the
latter point note that fair full insurance contracts must be oﬀered to people showing the test
result, since otherwise new firms would enter the market and make positive profits on low-
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Proof. See the Appendix 6.5.
Lemma 2 extends Doherty and Thistle’s Proposition 2 (1996) to the case
of secondary prevention. Our proof is diﬀerent, however, since Doherty and
Thistle consider a game with simultaneous moves, whereas we assign the first
move to insurers. Moreover, in Doherty and Thistle some consumers know their
risk ex-ante, whereas here all consumers are ex-ante uninformed.
From the previous discussion:14
Corollary 3 (Welfare properties of the equilibrium allocation under
Consent Law) When insurance against the classification risk is not available
and Consent Law is in place, the equilibrium allocation corresponds to the in-
terim optimal allocation and prevention choices are interim eﬃcient.
Since, under Consent Law, acquiring information is a dominant strategy for
decision-makers, the private value of information is positive. As for the social
value of information, it corresponds to the diﬀerence between welfare in the
equilibrium allocationW ∗I and welfare in the allocation that would emerge when
consumers remain uninformed WU .15 The following corollary can be stated:
Corollary 4 (The value of information under Consent Law) Under
Consent Law (i) the private value of information is positive; (ii) when con-
dition (9) holds, the social value of information is always negative. When the
opposite of condition (9) holds, the social value of information is positive for
Ψ3 < Ψ < Ψ4 and negative for Ψ < Ψ3 and Ψ > Ψ4.
3.3 The Strict Prohibition approach
Under Strict Prohibition insurers cannot request any genetic test and cannot use
genetic information for rating. This implies that, as under Consent Law, privacy
risks. Moreover, we have already observed that the same policy must be oﬀered to informed
consumers not showing the test result and to the uninformed. Thus, remaining uninformed
can never be a dominant strategy.
14Note that, when the information structure is such that insurers observe decision-makers’
information status but not the test result, a diﬀerent equilibrium allocation arises. In fact,
in such a case, diﬀerent contracts can be oﬀered to informed high-risks and to uninformed
decision-makers. Moreover, informed consumers not showing the test result are necessarily
high-risks. Thus, both uninformed and informed high-risk consumers receive full coverage
at a fair premium (respectively pUL(aU ) and pHL(aH)). As a consequence, when deciding
whether to learn their type, decision-makers must choose between the allocation for unin-
formed consumers WU and the interim optimal allocation W∗I so that we are back to the
equilibria obtained under the Disclosure Duty approach. This proves that, from a social wel-
fare point of view, Disclosure Duty is equivalent to a regulatory scheme assigning privacy to
the test result but not to consumers’ information status and allowing information transmission
on test results from consumers to insurers.
15To calculate the social value of information we do not compare the market outcome under
Consent Law with the ex-ante optimal allocation. In fact, since the classification risk is not
covered in our market (compulsory genetic insurance is not enforced), first-best can never be
reached.
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is assigned to consumer information status and to the test result; however, unlike
Consent Law, a ban is imposed on information transmission and use.16
We prove that, as under the Consent Law approach, information gathering
is a dominant strategy for decision-makers. However, here the equilibrium cor-
responds to the Rothschild-Stiglitz separating allocation. As before, insurers
are able to screen consumer types and the information acquired is disclosed at
the equilibrium. Unlike the previous case, informed low-risks receive partial
insurance.
The Rothschild-Stiglitz separating contracts work as a screening mechanism
only if performing the test is a dominant strategy for uninformed consumers.
We show in the following lemma that, if firms oﬀer consumers a set of self-
selective contracts involving partial insurance at a fair premium, decision-makers
will indeed choose to acquire information. In particular, as under Disclosure
Duty, insurance firms oﬀer three diﬀerent types of contract: one for uninformed
consumers, one for informed high-risks and one for informed low-risks. However,
since the consumers’ informational status is private information, here contracts
must be self-selecting.
Lemma 3 (Equilibrium allocation under Strict Prohibition) Under the
Strict Prohibition approach, decision-makers perform the test. The equilibrium
corresponds to the Rothschild-Stiglitz separating allocation.
Proof. See Appendix 6.6.
This result extends Doherty and Thistle’s Proposition 1 (1996) to the case
of secondary prevention. Again our proof is diﬀerent since in our model choices
are sequential and all decision-makers are ex-ante uninformed.17
As regards market outcome under Strict Prohibition we can say the follow-
ing:18
16The same information structure can also describe a situation where insurers’ associations
adopt a voluntary moratorium on the use of genetic tests.
17The existence of an equilibrium requires the usual Rothschild-Stiglitz condition on the
number of low-risks, which must be suﬃciently high (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976). If such
condition is not verified we can use diﬀerent equilibrium concepts such as the Wilson or the
Miyazaki equilibrium (see Wilson 1977 and Miyazaki 1977). Both equilibria emerge when
the Rothschild-Stiglitz one does not exist. The Wilson equilibrium occurs when insurers
can withdraw contracts making negative profits, whereas the Miyazaki equilibrium occurs
when insurance companies can oﬀer several contracts involving cross-subsidization. Note that
whatever concept of equilibrium we use, the proof in Appendix 6.6 still holds and information
gathering remains the consumers’ dominant strategy.
18Note that, when information structure is such that insurers observe decision-makers’
information status but not the test result and a ban on information transmission exists, a
diﬀerent equilibrium occurs. Since contracts can be contingent on consumers’ information
status, uninformed individuals receive full coverage at a fair premium whereas informed ones
receive self-selective (Rothschild-Stliglitz) contracts. As a consequence, when deciding whether
to learn information, decision-makers must choose between the allocation for uninformed
consumers WU and the lottery assigning full coverage at a high premium with probability
λ and partial coverage at a low premium with probability 1 − λ. This leads to equilibria
similar to the ones we obtained with Consent Law under the same informational structure
(see footnote 14). However, in the present case, consumers will prefer to remain uninformed
more often since here information gathering leads to the Rothschild-Stliglitz equilibrium, that
is to a lower welfare.
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Corollary 5 (Welfare properties of the equilibrium allocation under
Strict Prohibition) When insurance against the classification risk is not avail-
able and Strict Prohibition is in place, the equilibrium allocation is such that
high-risks receive full insurance at a fair premium, whereas low-risks receive
partial insurance at a fair premium. Prevention choices are interim eﬃcient for
high-risks, whereas low-risks perform prevention more often than in the interim
eﬃcient allocation.
Proof. The first sentence comes directly from Lemma 3. For the last sentence
see Appendix 6.7.
We have shown that under Strict Prohibition decision-makers perform the
test. Again this implies that the private value of information is positive. As
regards the social value of information, we compare the Rothschild-Stiglitz sep-
arating allocation and WU . The following corollary can be stated:
Corollary 6 (The value of information under Strict Prohibition) Un-
der Strict Prohibition (i) the private value of information is positive; (ii) when
condition (9) holds, the social value of information is always negative. When the
opposite of condition (9) holds, the social value of information is negative for
Ψ < Ψ3 and Ψ > Ψ4 and is lower than under consent law for Ψ3 < Ψ < Ψ4.19
We saw that under Consent Law the equilibrium allocation W ∗I dominates
WU only if the opposite of condition (9) holds and prevention costs belong to the
interval [Ψ3,Ψ4]. Under Strict Prohibition and when the previous conditions are
verified, social welfare is lower than under Consent Law because of the welfare
cost paid by (partially insured) low-risks in the Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium.
This explains the second part of point (ii) in Corollary 6.
3.4 The Laissez-Faire approach
Under the Laissez-Faire approach insurers can request the disclosure of existing
tests (as under Disclosure Duty) and they can also request new tests to be per-
formed (and disclosed). Since in our setting consumers are ex-ante uninformed,
this regulatory approach implies that insurers decide whether consumers should
perform the test or not. Given that the test is costless and useful for rating,
insurers will always ask consumers to perform the test. Like disclosure duty,
the Laissez-Faire approach implies symmetric information between consumers
and insurance firms.
A natural interpretation of the first actions in the timing is the following:
insurers ask potential consumers to perform the test and then the test result
19Contrary to us, Doherty and Posey (1998) find that the social value of information is
always positive when information structure corresponds to Strict Prohibition. This diﬀer-
ence essentially depends on the fact that, in their model, part of the consumers are ex-ante
informed. Thus, to evaluate the social value of information, they compare the equilibrium
allocation (where all consumers become informed) with the allocation that would arise with-
out information gathering (where the uninformed remain uninformed and informed consumers
receive the Rothschild-Stiglitz separating contracts).
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is disclosed to both consumers and insurers.20 The consequence is that, under
Laissez-Faire, insurers oﬀer full insurance contracts at a fair premium to high-
and low-types.
Lemma 4 (Equilibrium allocation under Laissez-Faire) Under the Laissez-
Faire approach the equilibrium allocation corresponds to the interim eﬃcient
allocation and prevention actions are interim eﬃcient.
Since under Laissez-Faire insurance firms require consumers to perform the
test, the private value of information has no meaning. As regards the social
value of information, as under Consent Law, we must compare allocations
W ∗I and WU . Thus, part (ii) in Corollary 4 also applies to the Laissez-Faire
approach.
4 A comparison of the alternative regulatory
approaches
We now compare the diﬀerent regulatory approaches analyzed before and derive
a complete ranking. From the four previous lemmas we can state the following:
Proposition 1 (Welfare comparison of the alternative regulatory ap-
proaches) From a social welfare point of view the Disclosure Duty approach
weakly dominates all the other regulatory schemes. The Laissez-Faire and the
Consent Law approaches lead to the same equilibrium allocation. The equilib-
rium allocation under Strict Prohibition is dominated by all the other regulatory
schemes.
In the rest of this section first we summarize our results as regards prevention
choices and then as regards information disclosure at the diﬀerent equilibria.
Under the Laissez-Faire and the Consent Law approaches prevention choices
are interim eﬃcient. With Strict Prohibition they are interim eﬃcient for high-
risks, whereas low-risks choose prevention under partial insurance. This implies
that low-risks perform prevention more often under Strict Prohibition than in
the interim eﬃcient allocation. Under Disclosure Duty prevention choices are
interim eﬃcient only in Equilibrium of Type 2 for prevention costs belonging
to the interval [Ψ3,Ψ4] . Importantly in such a specific case, Disclosure Duty,
Laissez-Faire and Consent Law all lead to the same equilibrium allocation and
therefore to the same social welfare, whereas in all the other cases disclosure duty
strongly dominates the other regulatory schemes even though it leads to less
eﬃcient prevention choices. Note that the eﬀectiveness of secondary prevention,
the magnitude of the classification risk as well as the cost of prevention all
20Note that, if the order of the first two actions in the timing were the same as before (first
insurers oﬀer contracts, then they ask consumers to perform the test and the test result is
disclosed), the first best allocation would be obtained. In fact, in such a case the insurance
contract oﬀered by insurers would also cover the classification risk. However, since in the real
world the classification risk is not covered, we exclude such a sequence of actions.
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aﬀect the decision to gather information under Disclosure Duty and therefore
the possibility of Equilibrium of Type 2 occurring.21
As a final observation Laissez-Faire, Consent Law and Strict Prohibition al-
ways lead to information disclosure at the equilibrium. Disclosure Duty, again,
leads to information disclosure only in Equilibrium of Type 2 and for interme-
diate values of prevention costs.
In general, either the informational structure is such that insurers observe the
test result, if any (as in the Laissez-Faire and in the Disclosure Duty approach),
or insurers learn information on consumer risks ex-post by using self-selective
contracts. Basically, under Consent Law information is transmitted at no cost
by low-risks showing insurers the test result. Under Strict Prohibition, on the
other hand, screening requires a welfare cost since self-selecting contracts provide
partial insurance to the low-risks. Put diﬀerently, Strict Prohibition is the only
regulatory scheme which endogenously produces standard adverse selection.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we contribute to the literature on genetic testing by (i) introducing
secondary prevention measures which assign decision-making value to genetic
information and by (ii) providing a welfare analysis of the alternative schemes
used to regulate genetic information. In particular, we investigate the four main
regulatory approaches we find today in health insurance markets: Laissez-Faire,
Disclosure Duty, Consent Law and Strict Prohibition. Our simple and tractable
model allows for unambiguous ranking.
In our model consumers may gather information on their risk of illness be-
fore insurance policy purchase. Insurance firms oﬀer policies covering the risk
of the monetary loss associated with the illness but not the classification risk.
We put ourselves in a context which seems more natural when considering infor-
mation provided by genetic testing: we assume that all consumers are ex-ante
uninformed and that information allows better choices as regards secondary
prevention.
Our model makes some assumptions that could be worth relaxing in the
future. Genetic tests have no cost and consumer prevention choices are observ-
able by insurance firms. However, the first assumption is common to almost all
the literature on genetic testing22 and the second one is plausible for secondary
prevention, which indicates a certifiable medical procedure.
21For example we expect Equilibrium of Type 1 to occur under Disclosure Duty in the case
of genetic test for Huntington’s disease since, for such an illness, classification risk is high
and early detection of disease is ineﬀective. Thus, Disclosure Duty should strongly dominate
the other regulatory schemes as regards testing for Huntington’s disease whereas Equilibrium
of Type 2 could occur under Disclosure Duty in the case of tests detecting BRCA1, BRCA2
or HNPCC genetic mutations since, for the illnesses related to those mutations, eﬀective
secondary prevention exists. Thus, for those tests and for some values of prevention costs,
Disclosure Duty could be equivalent to Consent Law and Laissez-Faire.
22An exception is Doherty and Thistle (1996).
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Our results show that market and health authorities aiming at maximiz-
ing consumers’ welfare should implement a mild type of regulation such as the
Disclosure Duty scheme. With this regulatory approach consumers are free to
decide whether to perform genetic tests but have no privacy rights on informa-
tion status and on test results. We have proved that only under Disclosure Duty
consumers remain uninformed when the cost imposed by the classification risk
prevails over the benefit of information in terms of better prevention measures,
that is, when gathering information is not eﬃcient.
The result that the insurance market performs better under mild regulation
than under strong regulation of genetic information is not new. In diﬀerent
models Hoel and Iversen (2002) and Hoel et al. (2006) reached the same con-
clusion.23 What clearly emerges from our analysis is that Strict Prohibition,
the most widespread regulatory approach, adopted with the explicit objective
of increasing consumers’ welfare by avoiding genetic discrimination, leads to the
worst market outcome from a consumer welfare point of view. Strict Prohibi-
tion assigns consumer privacy on information status and test result and bans
information transmission from consumers to insurers. Such a ban turns out to
be detrimental to consumer welfare because it leads to adverse selection and
thus prevents eﬃcient exchange in the health insurance market. Consent Law
performs better than Strict Prohibition because it assigns consumers both pri-
vacy on genetic information and control rights on information provided by the
test. More generally, privacy on genetic information turns out to be of no use in
preventing discrimination since under both Consent Law and Strict Prohibition
insurance firms adopt screening devices such that information is fully disclosed
at the equilibrium.
To conclude, governments aiming at protecting ”bad genetic risks” from
discrimination should not impose strict regulation of genetic information; they
should instead opt for a Disclosure Duty rule and then provide a specific public
program, or expand the existing ones, oﬀering (subsidized) insurance coverage
for the high-risks.24 Even better, governments should try to create the missing
market for ”genetic insurance”, as proposed by Tabarrok (1994). In this regard
our model characterizes the welfare loss due to the lack of coverage against
the classification risk and clearly states the importance of ”genetic insurance”
provision. We believe that it would be interesting to formally investigate reasons
why, in the real world, insurance markets are not able to provide coverage for
the classification risk. We leave this issue to future research.
23 In Hoy and Ruse (2005) the decision whether to gather information is not endogenous,
however the authors stress the ineﬃciencies due to adverse selection arising when privacy on
genetic information is assigned to consumers.
24Possible redistributional policies aimed at remedying existing inequality in health risk and
in insurance premium produced by genetic testing are analyzed in Rees and Apps (2006).
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Remark 2
(i) When pL ≥ Ψ∆0 the optimal action for low-type decision-makers corresponds
to a positive level of prevention: ba(pL) = 1. Given inequality 1, this implies:ba(pU ) = ba(pH) = 1, and, bV (pU ) = λbV (pH) + (1 − λ)bV (pL). Whereas when
pH ≤ Ψ∆0 the optimal action for high-type decision-makers corresponds to no-
prevention: ba(pH) = 0. Thus, ba(pU ) = ba(pL) = 0 and, again, bV (pU ) = λbV (pH)+
(1 − λ)bV (pL). (ii) Suppose first that pL < pU ≤ Ψ∆0 < pH . When uninformed,
decision-makers do not exert prevention such that bV (pU ) = pUu(w− L) + (1−
pU )u(w). If decision-makers acquire information, given again inequality 1, their
expected utility becomes:
λbV (pH) + (1− λ)bV (pL) = λ (pHu(w − l) + (1− pH)u(w)−Ψ)
+ (1− λ) (pLu(w − L) + (1− pL)u(w))
= λpHu(w − l) + (1− λ)pLu(w − L) + (1− pU )u(w)− λΨ
Using 1 it is easy to verify that bV (pU ) < λbV (pH)+ (1− λ)bV (pL). Suppose now
that pL < Ψ∆0 ≤ pU < pH . Here uninformed consumers choose prevention andbV (pU ) = pUu(w − l) + (1 − pU )u(w) −Ψ. By comparing bV (pU ) and λbV (pH)+
(1− λ)bV (pL) it is easy to verify that, again, bV (pU ) < λbV (pH)+ (1− λ)bV (pL).
6.2 Proof of Remark 3
(i) It comes directly from the discussion above Remark 3. (ii) It is easy to prove
that ∆(pi) is an increasing function. In fact,
∂∆(pi)
∂pi
= −lu0(w− pil) +Lu0(w−
piL) which is positive since L > l ≥ 0 and u0(w − piL) > u0(w − pil) ≥ 0. (iii)
Inequality (1) is the condition for positive prevention without insurance and can
be written as pi∆0 ≥ Ψ. We compare inequality (1) with (2), and we prove that
∆(pi) ≤ pi∆0. The latter inequality can be rewritten as u(w − pil) − piu(w −
l) ≤ u(w − piL) −piu(w − L). Let f(x) = u(w − pix) − piu(w − x). f 0(x) =
−piu0(w − pix) + piu0(w − x) be positive as soon as 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1 and u concave.
Then f is increasing and u(w − pil) − piu(w − l) = f(l) ≤ f(L) = u(w − piL)
−piu(w − L).
6.3 Proof of Remark 5
We start with the proof of (ii). Functions W ∗I and WU cross each other twice if
W ∗I calculated in Ψ = ∆(pU ) is larger than WU = u(w − pUL) (see Figure 3);
this writes:
λu(w − pH l) + (1− λ)u(w − pLL)− λ∆(pU ) > u(w − pUL) (10)
Substituting ∆(pU ) = u(w−pU l) − u(w−pUL) and rearranging inequality (10),
the opposite of condition (9) can be easily found. Ψ3 is the value on the left of
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∆(pU ) such that W ∗I = u(w− pU l)−Ψ, whereas Ψ4 is the value on the right of
∆(pU ) such that W ∗I = u(w − pUL). (i) It comes immediately from (ii).
6.4 Proof of Remark 6
Let’s substitute pH − pU = (1− λ)(pH − pL) and pU − pL = λ(pH − pL) in the
l.h.s. of (9) and call pH − pL = x. We can therefore rewrite the l.h.s. of (9) as
a function of x:
Γu(x) =
[u(w−pU l)−u(w−pU l−(1−λ)lx)]
(1−λ)l
[u(w−pUL+λLx)−u(w−pUL)]
λL
Because of the concavity of u, Γ is an increasing function such that:
Γu(0) =
u0(w − pU l)
u0(w − pUL)
≤ 1. (11)
Moreover, substituting Γu(x) in condition (9), W ∗I and WU cross each other
if:
Γu(pH − pL) ≤
L
l
(12)
Putting together (11) and (12):
0 ≤ pH − pL ≤ Γ−1u
µ
L
l
¶
.
6.5 Proof of Lemma 2
The proof is organized in two steps. First we show that, at the equilibrium,
decision-makers perform the test when insurance firms oﬀer full-insurance con-
tracts; we then show that the result does not change when firms are free to oﬀer
partial-insurance contracts.
(i) Full-insurance contracts. Suppose that firms are constrained to oﬀer
full-insurance contracts. Insurers ex-ante propose 4 full-insurance contracts con-
tingent on the decision-maker’s action and on the test result if decision-makers
decide to show it, and 2 full-insurance contracts only contingent on the pre-
ventative action if decision-makers do not show the test result. The insurance
premiums are:
with prevention without prevention
Show result L πL1 = pLl πL0 = pLL
Show result H πH1 = pH l πH0 = pHL
Don’t show πN1 πN0
We are looking for an equilibrium where decision-makers perform the test and
show the test result to insurers when the test reveals good news. For this
equilibrium to exist, we have necessarily pH l ≥ πN1 ≥ pLl and pHL ≥ πN0 ≥
pLL.
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When deciding whether to perform the test or not, decision-makers must
compare:
λmax {u(w − πN1)−Ψ, u(w − πN0)}+(1−λ)max
aL
(u(w − pLL(aL))−Ψ(aL))
(13)
with:
max {u(w − πN1)−Ψ, u(w − πN0)} , (14)
where (13) is expected utility when the test is performed: with probability λ
the decision-maker is high-risk, does not show the test result and chooses the
maximum between full-insurance with prevention and full-insurance without
prevention; with probability 1 − λ the decision-maker is low-risk, shows the
test result and maximizes his full-insurance utility with respect to the action,
whereas (14) is utility when decision-makers remain uninformed.
We now show that expected utility with the test (13) is higher than expected
utility without the test (14). Suppose it is not. Then it must necessarily be:
max (u(w − πN1)−Ψ, u(w − πN0)) ≥ max
aL
u(w − pLL(aL))−Ψ(aL)
then nobody performs the test and πN1 = pU l , πN0 = pUL. However this is
impossible since:
max
aL
u(w − pLL(aL))−Ψ(aL) > max
aU
u(w − pUL(aU ))−Ψ(aU )
We proved that it must be:
max (u(w − πN1)−Ψ, u(w − πN0)) ≤ max
aL
u(w − pLL(aL))−Ψ(aL)
This implies that expected utility with the test (13) dominates utility without
the test (14) and decision-makers prefer to gather information.
We can conclude that the allocation where uninformed decision-makers per-
form the test and show it to insurers only when they learn to be low-types is an
equilibrium. Thus, at the equilibrium, all decision-makers not showing the test
are high-risk such that πN1 = pH l and πN0 = pHL : both high- and low-risks
receive full insurance at a fair premium.
(ii) Partial-insurance contracts. Suppose now that insurance companies
can propose ex-ante self-selective contracts with partial coverage. In this case,
firms will oﬀer full-insurance contracts for those who show the test result and a
contract with partial coverage for those who declare that they are uninformed.
Let’s call y or Y the partial coverage according to whether decision-makers
choose prevention or not. As a result we obtain the set of contracts illustrated
in the following table:
with prevention without prevention
Show result L πL1 = pLl, full coverage πL0 = pLL, full coverage
Show result H πH1 = pH l, full coverage πH0 = pHL, full coverage
Don’t show pUy, partial coverage pUY, partial coverage
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To be self-selecting the proposed partial-insurance contracts must be such that
informed high-types are indiﬀerent between showing the test result and thus
obtaining full insurance at a fair premium and pretending to be uninformed
and thus obtaining partial insurance, i.e.:
u(w − pHL) = pHu(w − pUY + Y − L) + (1− pH)u(w − pUY ) = UH(Y )(15)
u(w − pH l) = pHu(w − pUy + y − l) + (1− pH)u(w − pUy) = UH(y) (16)
where UH(Y ) is expected utility for high-risks under partial insurance and
without prevention and UH(y) is expected utility gross of prevention cost under
partial insurance and with prevention.
Suppose now that uninformed consumers perform the test. When the test
result is pL decision-makers show it to insurers and receive full insurance at a fair
premium. When the test result is pH decision-makers are indiﬀerent between
showing the test result and pretending to be uninformed according to equations
(15) and (16). Assume that, when indiﬀerent, high-risks show the test result to
insurers and receive full insurance at a fair premium too.
As a consequence, performing the test gives:
W ∗I = λu(w − pHL(aˆH)) + (1− λ)u(w − pLL(aˆL))− λΨ(aˆH)− (1− λ)Ψ(aˆL)
= λW ∗H + (1− λ)W ∗L (17)
where:
W ∗L = max(u(w − pLL), u(w − pLl)−Ψ) (18)
and, for construction:
W ∗H = max(UH(Y ), UH(y)−Ψ) = max(u(w − pHL), u(w − pH l)−Ψ) (19)
Let’s now consider expected utility, gross of prevention cost, obtained by low-
risks when they stay uninformed, receive the partial insurance contract and
perform prevention:
UL(y) = pLu(w − pUy + y − l) + (1− pL)u(w − pUy)
< u(pL(w − pUy + y − l) + (1− pL)(w − pUy))
= u(w − pLl − (pU − pL)y)
< u(w − pLl) (20)
In the same way let’s consider expected utility obtained by low-risks when they
stay uninformed, receive the partial insurance contract and do not perform
prevention.25 The following holds:
UL(Y ) < u(w − pLL) (21)
25Note that in proof (i), the premium for those who declare that they are uninformed was
constrained by the full coverage l (or L). Thus, the probability in such a premium was neces-
sarily the equilibrium probability (or the type of those who declare that they are uninformed
at the equilibrium). Here, on the contrary, because of partial insurance a degree of freedom
exists as regards the premium for those who declare that they are uninformed. Thus, any
probability can be chosen in the premium, provided that the coverage is the equilibrium cov-
erage y (Y ) given by equations (16) and (15). In the proof we have taken probability pU
because the latter allows inequalities (20) and (21) to be easily obtained.
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Inequalities (20) and (21) imply that low-risks receive a larger utility when they
obtain full insurance at a fair premium then when they stay uninformed and
obtain the partial insurance contract. This writes:
W ∗L > max(UL(Y ), UL(y)−Ψ) (22)
Finally, by remaining uninformed, decision-makers get:
max(UU (Y ), UU (y)−Ψ)
= max(λUH(Y ) + (1− λ)UL(Y ), λUH(y) + (1− λ)UL(y)−Ψ) (23)
Now we can compare (17) and (23) taking into account (19) and (22). We find:
λW ∗H + (1− λ)W ∗L > max(UU (Y ), UU (y)−Ψ)
so that uninformed decision-makers strictly prefer to take the test.
6.6 Proof of Lemma 3
As pL ≤ pU ≤ pH , the problem is formally equivalent to a 3-type Rothschild-
Stiglitz model. At the equilibrium, firms oﬀer a set of self-selective contracts
involving partial insurance at a fair premium. Let’s denote x(a), y(a) and z(a)
the oﬀered coverages when the level of prevention is a according to the following
table:
coverage and premium
Type H z(a), pHz(a)
Uninformed y(a), pUy(a)
Type L x(a), pLx(a)
Let’s call Ui(α, β, a) = piu(w − L(a) + α − β) + (1 − pi)u(w − β) − Ψ(a)
type-i expected utility with coverage α, premium β and action a, where α =
z(a), y(a), x(a); β = pHz(a), pUy(a), pLx(a); i = H,U,L and a = 0 or 1.
To be self-selecting, the insurers’ oﬀer must fulfill:
UH(z(a), pHz(a), a) ≥ UH(y(a), pUy(a), a)
UH(z(a), pHz(a), a) ≥ UH(x(a), pLx(a), a)
UU (y(a), pUy(a), a) ≥ UU (z(a), pHz(a), a)
UU (y(a), pUy(a), a) ≥ UU (x(a), pLx(a), a)
UL(x(a), pLx(a), a) ≥ UL(y(a), pUy(a), a)
UL(x(a), pLx(a), a) ≥ UL(z(a), pHz(a), a)
To decide whether to perform the test, an ex-ante uninformed individual
must compare max
a
(UU (y(a), pUy(a), a)) , with :
λmax
a
(UH(z(a), pHz(a), a)) + (1− λ)max
a
(UL(x(a), pLx(a), a))
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As the set of contracts is self-selective, we have:
UH(z(a), pHz(a), a) ≥ UH(y(a), pUy(a), a)
UL(x(a), pLx(a), a) ≥ UL(y(a), pUy(a), a)
and then:
λmax
a
(UH(z(a), pHz(a), a)) + (1− λ)max
a
(UL(x(a), pLx(a), a))
≥ λmax
a
(UH(y(a), pUy(a), a)) + (1− λ)max
a
(UL(y(a), pUy(a), a))
≥ max
a
(λUH(y(a), pUy(a), a) + (1− λ)UL(y(a), pUy(a), a))
= max
a
(UU (y(a), pUy(a), a))
This implies that, ex-ante, gathering information is a dominant strategy for
decision-makers whatever the set of self-selective contracts proposed by the in-
surers.
It follows that the only possible equilibrium is the 2-type Rothschild-Stiglitz
separating allocation with z(a) = L(aˆH) and x(a) < L(aˆL).
6.7 Proof of Corollary 5
We must show that low-risks have more incentives to perform prevention in the
Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium than in the interim eﬃcient allocation. At the
equilibrium, low-risks perform prevention if the following inequality holds:
pLu(w − pLx+ x− l) + (1− pL)u(w − pLx)−Ψ ≥
pLu(w − pLX +X − L) + (1− pL)u(w − pLX)
where x andX are partial insurance coverages for informed low-risks respectively
when they choose prevention and when they do not. From Remark 3 (point
(iii)) we know that, given a risk pi, incentives to perform prevention under full
insurance are lower than without insurance. For a continuity argument it follows
that low-risks’ incentives to perform prevention under full insurance are lower
than under partial insurance.
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